MOSS FROM A ROLLING STONEMuch ado, not much to do, about a visitShahid AlamMuch
has been written on India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent
visit to Bangladesh. First, much media hype, and, then, much media spin
have spewed forth, and, as was to be expected, painted in shades of
positive or negative colours, depending on the proclivities of the
newspaper, writer, or commentator. I aim to assess the visit from the
standpoint of political realism. When judged against the yardstick of
major objectives being realised, the visit was a signal failure. No
amount of spin, irrespective of it coming out of official government
circles or other sources, will take away from that conclusion. You can
have all the easing of enclave restrictions, or Memorandums of
Understanding on Educational Cooperation between Jawaharlal Nehru
University and Dhaka University or Cooperation between Doordarshan and
BTV, but the fact remains that the most critical deals on which the
visit’s success hinged did not come off. If, in consonance with the
average Bengali’s persona of hyper-emotionalism, expectations were great
from the visit, the disappointment, even despondency, could be tempered
if the visit was assessed in terms of the standpoint of political
realism, or, to use a more apparently sophisticated and recondite
equivalent, realpolitik. It is a policy based on practicalities and
power rather than on doctrine or ethical objectives, and its most famous
exponent was the nineteenth century Prussian (later German) Chancellor
Prince Otto von Bismarck, who eschewed ideology for national interest.
And, yes, as is common knowledge, the spanner in the works of a successful outcome was thrown by the intransigence of Paschimbanga Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Therefore, the expected Teesta water-sharing treaty did not materialise. While it was a major setback for Bangladesh-India relations, it emphatically did not signal a permanent rift in them. The only permanent truth in international politics/relations is that nothing is permanent in inter-state relations. There are no permanent foes or permanent friends in the international system. And the international system itself is in a constant state of flux, where the nation-state, looking out for the furtherance of its national interests first and only, reigns supreme, and a tacitly acknowledged pecking order of countries, rather than any supranational organisation, determines critical global issues. Another bit of truism in the study and practice of international relations, which has had a preponderant influence on the visit, is that the domestic political compulsion of a country will dictate its foreign policy. In a very real sense, international politics is an extension of domestic politics. Among the more celebrated, as well as longstanding, examples upholding this axiom are the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the core problem of the Middle East, the Palestine-Israel issue. On more than one occasion both these questions came close to being resolved to the satisfaction of the concerned parties, but domestic political complexities managed to scupper them each time.
The Paschimbanga chief minister’s perceived “U-turn” on the key issue of the proposed Teesta water-sharing deal between the two countries requires viewing from the standpoint of domestic political compulsion and political realism. The unseemly timing of the so-called “U-turn” has understandably caused so many in Bangladesh (as well as a good number in India) to pinpoint her as the arch-villain, and the Dhaka newspapers to have published sour-faced pictures (it is amazing to take in the variety of grouchy photos that have emerged!) of her. But only a few weeks back they showed a smiling Mamata having a convivial sit-in at the common border between her state and our nation-state with several Bangladeshi notables on an occasion that was decidedly in the category of “low politics”, and could not exude anything but all-around bonhomie. Then there was no domestic compulsion of any significance on the issue, bolstered by the fact that the two incumbent governments enjoy a very warm relationship.
But that was then, when domestic compulsions were non-existent or minimal on the issue; this time around, they were potent. Mamata Banerjee very likely had a greater personal agenda that called for throwing the spanner in the wheels of Manmohan Singh’s visit. She did not even visit with the entourage as she was slated to do, crying off at the last minute on a flimsy pretext, thereby ensuring dramatics to draw attention to herself and her agenda, while at the same time undermining her country’s prime minister’s purpose, and stealing whatever thunder he could have gained in his countrymen and women’s eyes from a visit to Bangladesh. She might have been unaware, although this is highly unlikely given her experience and considerable acumen as a seasoned politician, of the discomfiture that the consequence of her political legerdemain would cause the friendly government in Dhaka, but if she was aware, as is likely, then any consideration for the benefit of the government would be thrown aside in favour of her own and her political party’s agenda promotion. And, that would be a normal thing to do in international politics. To reiterate, in this context, friendship between states is temporary, on a day-to-day basis, to be pursued if ones self-interest is served in the course of bilateral ties. But those ties are not binding.
From her standpoint, with the possible larger objective in mind, Mamata Banerjee played realpolitik, with the prize being the premiership of her country, which, if attained, would be a first for a Bengali in the 64 year history of modern India. She has probably realised that Manmohan Singh’s coalition government is in a less-than-secure situation, and by taking a definitive intractable stand on the issue of water-sharing that possibly many in India would support, she might have been expecting to gain significant political mileage out of it. Whether she will or not, or will eventually use it as a political trump card, and with what success, if any, only time will tell, but her ploy was a calculated political gamble. And politics involves a lot of gambling on the part of the political players.
Mamata might be contemplating that her party would be key to another possible future coalition government (a phenomenon that has been rather frequent in recent Indian history) and her leadership, based on a strong track record of upholding India’s interest first and foremost, if not only, in international relations will carry her to the coveted position of prime minister. And she laid out in no uncertain terms the terms of her Teesta water-sharing scheme, one that just might have portrayed Manmohan Singh in the eyes of the Indian public as being unduly pliable and much more giving than would be warranted to the other party. It is likely that the Indian public would be more truculent over conceding on issues they consider more important than water-sharing, but, make no mistake, water is of major concern to at least a large section of the Indians. In fact, water as a resource has expectedly surfaced as a contentious issue in bilateral, as well as multilateral, relations between, and among, countries. It could be that, come election time, Mamata’s dug-in position will count for little in her favour in the eyes of the electorate, who might prioritise more pressing issues demanding attention for the country and its people’s general welfare, but she threw the dice because high stakes politics more often than not demands some kind of high rolling. A successful roll could land the thrower the grand prize of premiership (or presidency) of the country.
So, for Mamata, the putative political mileage of defining her limitations on water-sharing and perceived safeguarding of national interest overrode any consideration of possible economic and political benefits from gaining transit facilities through Bangladeshi territory. That was in keeping with the practice in international relations, however one chooses to prioritise national interest. Nonetheless, if, as is obvious, water is vital to India’s national interest, for Bangladesh, it embodies the very essence of the adage of water meaning life. With limited natural resources and being a lower riparian country, Bangladesh literally has to depend on the bounty of the great rivers traversing the length of the country, with tributaries taking care of the breadth, and emptying themselves into the Bay of Bengal. And Mamata offers only a maximum of 25 per cent of the water of one of those vital great rivers, the Teesta! Keeping 75 per cent of its water would, as I see it, make a marginal positive difference for India in comparison to the acute hardship that would be visited on Bangladesh and its people. India can cope with a much reduced flow, although I suspect Indian experts and politicians would dispute that, but Bangladesh cannot with Mamata’s proposition, and no Indian expert or politician can rationally carp about that conclusion.
One would have thought that settling water issues, which many academics and specialists have been predicting would become a causus bellum between nations unless resolved amicably to all parties’ satisfaction, would be beneficial to India in the long run, as would be gaining transit facilities. However, Manmohan Singh caved in to Mamata’s demand, and, in the process, forfeited any transit deal, thereby eloquently signaling at least a measure of political weakness vis-à-vis the chief minister. The Indian political scenario should be interesting watching over the next couple of years! Things could change in the meantime, and New Delhi’s (and Paschimbanga’s) domestic political compulsions could change to Bangladesh’s advantage in Teesta water-sharing. To reiterate, nothing is forever in international politics and there are no permanent friends and foes in the international system.
The point that needs to be emphasised is that, just as India (and Mamata Banerjee, especially as she has single-handedly placed a damper on Indo-Bangladesh relations by using the excuse of national, not to mention personal, interest) has looked to its interests first and foremost, so should Bangladesh look out for its. That is the way in the nation-state-based international system. Its interest, among others, lies in getting its fair share of water from the rivers as a lower riparian country whose very lifeline depends so critically on them. And it has to play whatever hands it holds judiciously in order to obtain a quid pro quo. A strong hand that Dhaka is currently holding is granting of transit facilities. It has to be a quid pro quo. India cannot expect to be given transit through Bangladesh, something it desires and would be beneficial to it, without making the reciprocal offering of giving Dhaka what it wants and desperately requires. There is absolutely no scope for a one-way traffic. Bangladesh would benefit from transit, some experts believe as much as India would, if the operation ran smoothly, but would stand to lose far, far more if the Teesta waters were not shared according to its legitimate requirements. The benefits from transit could not even come close to compensating for the losses it would suffer if its water-sharing claim was not met. Bangladesh needs to look out for its own interests first and foremost, and then worry about someone else’s.
Any country (and its government) has to maximise its people’s welfare. It means, at the very least, ensuring their minimum economic needs, facilitating their shelter, and providing for their security. Prosperity for the general population would then become a factor of how the government and its people proceed and progress over time. For Bangladesh, both the transit, and, more crucially, water issues are important to its welfare. For the time being at least, its putative benefits from transit have been stymied by Mamata Banerjee’s political gamesmanship over the Teesta water-sharing. But, thus far, there is one area over which this government can hold its head high. Amidst a litany of failures, and, whether because of that or political expediency, or both, Bangladesh has played well the card of transit consideration in exchange of a Teesta water deal. Let Mamata Banerjee and the Indian government deal with that. The Bangladesh government has to stay the course, and take it to its natural conclusion, keeping in clear perspective its own national interest.
The writer is Head, Media and Communication department, Independent University, Bangladesh.
Source:
And, yes, as is common knowledge, the spanner in the works of a successful outcome was thrown by the intransigence of Paschimbanga Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Therefore, the expected Teesta water-sharing treaty did not materialise. While it was a major setback for Bangladesh-India relations, it emphatically did not signal a permanent rift in them. The only permanent truth in international politics/relations is that nothing is permanent in inter-state relations. There are no permanent foes or permanent friends in the international system. And the international system itself is in a constant state of flux, where the nation-state, looking out for the furtherance of its national interests first and only, reigns supreme, and a tacitly acknowledged pecking order of countries, rather than any supranational organisation, determines critical global issues. Another bit of truism in the study and practice of international relations, which has had a preponderant influence on the visit, is that the domestic political compulsion of a country will dictate its foreign policy. In a very real sense, international politics is an extension of domestic politics. Among the more celebrated, as well as longstanding, examples upholding this axiom are the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the core problem of the Middle East, the Palestine-Israel issue. On more than one occasion both these questions came close to being resolved to the satisfaction of the concerned parties, but domestic political complexities managed to scupper them each time.
The Paschimbanga chief minister’s perceived “U-turn” on the key issue of the proposed Teesta water-sharing deal between the two countries requires viewing from the standpoint of domestic political compulsion and political realism. The unseemly timing of the so-called “U-turn” has understandably caused so many in Bangladesh (as well as a good number in India) to pinpoint her as the arch-villain, and the Dhaka newspapers to have published sour-faced pictures (it is amazing to take in the variety of grouchy photos that have emerged!) of her. But only a few weeks back they showed a smiling Mamata having a convivial sit-in at the common border between her state and our nation-state with several Bangladeshi notables on an occasion that was decidedly in the category of “low politics”, and could not exude anything but all-around bonhomie. Then there was no domestic compulsion of any significance on the issue, bolstered by the fact that the two incumbent governments enjoy a very warm relationship.
But that was then, when domestic compulsions were non-existent or minimal on the issue; this time around, they were potent. Mamata Banerjee very likely had a greater personal agenda that called for throwing the spanner in the wheels of Manmohan Singh’s visit. She did not even visit with the entourage as she was slated to do, crying off at the last minute on a flimsy pretext, thereby ensuring dramatics to draw attention to herself and her agenda, while at the same time undermining her country’s prime minister’s purpose, and stealing whatever thunder he could have gained in his countrymen and women’s eyes from a visit to Bangladesh. She might have been unaware, although this is highly unlikely given her experience and considerable acumen as a seasoned politician, of the discomfiture that the consequence of her political legerdemain would cause the friendly government in Dhaka, but if she was aware, as is likely, then any consideration for the benefit of the government would be thrown aside in favour of her own and her political party’s agenda promotion. And, that would be a normal thing to do in international politics. To reiterate, in this context, friendship between states is temporary, on a day-to-day basis, to be pursued if ones self-interest is served in the course of bilateral ties. But those ties are not binding.
From her standpoint, with the possible larger objective in mind, Mamata Banerjee played realpolitik, with the prize being the premiership of her country, which, if attained, would be a first for a Bengali in the 64 year history of modern India. She has probably realised that Manmohan Singh’s coalition government is in a less-than-secure situation, and by taking a definitive intractable stand on the issue of water-sharing that possibly many in India would support, she might have been expecting to gain significant political mileage out of it. Whether she will or not, or will eventually use it as a political trump card, and with what success, if any, only time will tell, but her ploy was a calculated political gamble. And politics involves a lot of gambling on the part of the political players.
Mamata might be contemplating that her party would be key to another possible future coalition government (a phenomenon that has been rather frequent in recent Indian history) and her leadership, based on a strong track record of upholding India’s interest first and foremost, if not only, in international relations will carry her to the coveted position of prime minister. And she laid out in no uncertain terms the terms of her Teesta water-sharing scheme, one that just might have portrayed Manmohan Singh in the eyes of the Indian public as being unduly pliable and much more giving than would be warranted to the other party. It is likely that the Indian public would be more truculent over conceding on issues they consider more important than water-sharing, but, make no mistake, water is of major concern to at least a large section of the Indians. In fact, water as a resource has expectedly surfaced as a contentious issue in bilateral, as well as multilateral, relations between, and among, countries. It could be that, come election time, Mamata’s dug-in position will count for little in her favour in the eyes of the electorate, who might prioritise more pressing issues demanding attention for the country and its people’s general welfare, but she threw the dice because high stakes politics more often than not demands some kind of high rolling. A successful roll could land the thrower the grand prize of premiership (or presidency) of the country.
So, for Mamata, the putative political mileage of defining her limitations on water-sharing and perceived safeguarding of national interest overrode any consideration of possible economic and political benefits from gaining transit facilities through Bangladeshi territory. That was in keeping with the practice in international relations, however one chooses to prioritise national interest. Nonetheless, if, as is obvious, water is vital to India’s national interest, for Bangladesh, it embodies the very essence of the adage of water meaning life. With limited natural resources and being a lower riparian country, Bangladesh literally has to depend on the bounty of the great rivers traversing the length of the country, with tributaries taking care of the breadth, and emptying themselves into the Bay of Bengal. And Mamata offers only a maximum of 25 per cent of the water of one of those vital great rivers, the Teesta! Keeping 75 per cent of its water would, as I see it, make a marginal positive difference for India in comparison to the acute hardship that would be visited on Bangladesh and its people. India can cope with a much reduced flow, although I suspect Indian experts and politicians would dispute that, but Bangladesh cannot with Mamata’s proposition, and no Indian expert or politician can rationally carp about that conclusion.
One would have thought that settling water issues, which many academics and specialists have been predicting would become a causus bellum between nations unless resolved amicably to all parties’ satisfaction, would be beneficial to India in the long run, as would be gaining transit facilities. However, Manmohan Singh caved in to Mamata’s demand, and, in the process, forfeited any transit deal, thereby eloquently signaling at least a measure of political weakness vis-à-vis the chief minister. The Indian political scenario should be interesting watching over the next couple of years! Things could change in the meantime, and New Delhi’s (and Paschimbanga’s) domestic political compulsions could change to Bangladesh’s advantage in Teesta water-sharing. To reiterate, nothing is forever in international politics and there are no permanent friends and foes in the international system.
The point that needs to be emphasised is that, just as India (and Mamata Banerjee, especially as she has single-handedly placed a damper on Indo-Bangladesh relations by using the excuse of national, not to mention personal, interest) has looked to its interests first and foremost, so should Bangladesh look out for its. That is the way in the nation-state-based international system. Its interest, among others, lies in getting its fair share of water from the rivers as a lower riparian country whose very lifeline depends so critically on them. And it has to play whatever hands it holds judiciously in order to obtain a quid pro quo. A strong hand that Dhaka is currently holding is granting of transit facilities. It has to be a quid pro quo. India cannot expect to be given transit through Bangladesh, something it desires and would be beneficial to it, without making the reciprocal offering of giving Dhaka what it wants and desperately requires. There is absolutely no scope for a one-way traffic. Bangladesh would benefit from transit, some experts believe as much as India would, if the operation ran smoothly, but would stand to lose far, far more if the Teesta waters were not shared according to its legitimate requirements. The benefits from transit could not even come close to compensating for the losses it would suffer if its water-sharing claim was not met. Bangladesh needs to look out for its own interests first and foremost, and then worry about someone else’s.
Any country (and its government) has to maximise its people’s welfare. It means, at the very least, ensuring their minimum economic needs, facilitating their shelter, and providing for their security. Prosperity for the general population would then become a factor of how the government and its people proceed and progress over time. For Bangladesh, both the transit, and, more crucially, water issues are important to its welfare. For the time being at least, its putative benefits from transit have been stymied by Mamata Banerjee’s political gamesmanship over the Teesta water-sharing. But, thus far, there is one area over which this government can hold its head high. Amidst a litany of failures, and, whether because of that or political expediency, or both, Bangladesh has played well the card of transit consideration in exchange of a Teesta water deal. Let Mamata Banerjee and the Indian government deal with that. The Bangladesh government has to stay the course, and take it to its natural conclusion, keeping in clear perspective its own national interest.
The writer is Head, Media and Communication department, Independent University, Bangladesh.
Source:
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