Memoir

A long list of suckers

Thomas L. Friedman

Last week, I toured the great Mogul compound of Fatehpur Sikri, near the Taj Mahal. My Indian guide mentioned in passing that in the late 1500s, when Afghanistan was part of India and the Mogul Empire, the Iranian Persians invaded Afghanistan in an effort to "seize the towns of Herat and Kandahar" and a great battle ensued. I had to laugh to myself: "Well, add them to that long list of suckers -- countries certain that controlling Afghanistan's destiny was vital to their national security."
There were already plenty on that list before, and there have been even more since. As America now debates how to extract itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is worth re-reading a little Central Asian history and recalling for how many centuries great powers -- from India to Persia, from Britain to Russia, and now from America to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan -- have wrestled for supremacy in this region, in different versions of what came to be called "The Great Game." One can only weep at the thought of how much blood and treasure have been expended in this pursuit and how utterly ungreat this game has been in retrospect. No one ever wins for long, and all they win is a bill.
It is with this bias that I think about the debate following President Obama's decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq, on schedule, at the end of this year -- a decision that has been greeted with much huffing and puffing from hawkish Republicans about how Obama will be remembered for losing Iraq to Iran. Iraq will now fall under Iran's "influence," they proclaim, and none of us will ever be able to sleep well again.
Please put me down in the camp that thinks Obama did the right thing and that Iran's mullahs will not be the winners.
Why? Well, for starters, centuries of history teach us that Arabs and Persians do not play well together. Yes, Iraq has a Shiite Muslim majority and so does Iran. But Iraqi Arab Shiites willingly fought for eight years against Persian Iranian Shiites in the Iran-Iraq war.
Moreover, I am certain that in recent years America's lingering troop presence in Iraq actually gave Iran greater influence in Baghdad. The U.S., however well intentioned, became a lightening rod that absorbed a lot of Iraqis' frustrations with their government's underperformance, and the U.S. "occupation" drew all attention away from Iran's shenanigans inside Iraq. Iraqis are a proud people. Once our troops are gone, Iraqi Arabs will surely focus entirely on their own government's performance and on any Iranian or other attempts to try to be the puppeteer of Iraqi politics. Any Iraqi leader seen as Tehran's lackey will have problems.
Indeed, once we're gone, I actually think the dominant flow of influence will be from Iraq toward Iran -- if (and it is still a big if) -- Iraq's democracy holds. If it does, Iranians will have to look across the border every day at Iraqis, with their dozens of free newspapers and freedom to form any party and vote for any leader, and wonder why these "inferior" Iraqi Arab Shiites enjoy such freedoms and "superior" Iranian Persian Shiites do not.
"Iran's interests were served by the Arab status quo ante -- ideologically bankrupt regimes brutalising disenfranchised populations," argues Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment. "The more representative governments there are in the Middle East, the more it highlights the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a salmon swimming upstream against the current of history."
Some say Iran was the geopolitical winner of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. I'd hold off on that judgment, too. "The Iranian regime is at its lowest moment of influence in the region -- 14% popularity in the latest Zogby poll," remarked Abbas Milani, who teaches Iranian politics at Stanford. What you see today if you look underneath the Islamic revolutionary facade in Iran, added Milani, "is a flourishing of painting, films and music, driven by technology. It is a society seeking its own bottom-up blend of Islam and modernity. The regime has no role in this."
Just as I don't buy the notion that we need to keep playing The Great Game in Iraq, I also don't buy it for Afghanistan.
"If the U.S. steps back, it will see that it has a lot more options," argues C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research, in New Delhi. "You let the contending regional forces play out against each other and then you can then tilt the balance." He is referring to the India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Northern Alliance tribes in Afghanistan. "At this point, you have the opposite problem. You are sitting in the middle and are everyone's hate-object, and everyone sees some great conspiracy in whatever you do. Once you pull out, and create the capacity to alter the balance, you will have a lot more options and influence to affect outcomes -- rather than being pushed around and attacked by everyone."
America today needs much more cost-efficient ways to influence geopolitics in Asia than keeping troops there indefinitely. We need to better leverage the natural competitions in this region to our ends. There is more than one way to play The Great Game, and we need to learn it.

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